


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


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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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4. USSR: Gromyko showed little if any maneuverability in talks with British. (Page 5)
  5. Congo: Rebel build-up in Fizi region continues. (Page 7)
  6. Notes: Israel-Syria; Afghanistan; South Korea. (Page 8)

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## CYPRUS



20 Mar 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

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USSR: [Foreign Minister Gromyko showed little if any maneuverability on major issues during his talks with the British this week.]

[Gromyko maintained a relaxed attitude throughout the talks, but he repeatedly stressed that the US was responsible for most of the present difficulties between East and West. He indicated that, especially in light of the Vietnam crisis, the Soviet Union would continue its "freeze" in relations with the West.]

[The USSR apparently does not consider the time ripe for formal initiatives in seeking a basis for negotiations on Vietnam. In his press conference yesterday, Gromyko categorically rejected even the possibility of discussing ways and means to bring about an international conference on Vietnam.]

[Gromyko told the British privately that the USSR takes its Geneva conference cochairmen duties "seriously" and believes one of the primary duties of the cochairmen is to induce the US to "cease aggression" in Vietnam. However, he rebuffed British Foreign Secretary Stewart's attempt to probe for conditions for a Geneva conference.]

[Gromyko asserted that the US, as "the aggressor," has no right to attempt to set preconditions for negotiations. He further stated that until the US withdraws its demands for preconditions, there is "no point in engaging in hypothetical discussions about negotiations."]

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[Although Gromyko reiterated standard Soviet formulations on disarmament questions, he left the door open for a resumption of the Geneva Disarmament talks. He firmly repeated Moscow's position that a settlement of the UN financial crisis would have to be made strictly on the basis of "voluntary" contributions]

[Gromyko left the impression with the British that Moscow would not be receptive to a Western initiative on German reunification at this time]

[British officials, in commenting on Gromyko's over-all performance, expressed the view that divisive factors within the Communist world have greatly reduced the Soviet area for maneuver]

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
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## EAST AFRICA



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Congo: The rebel build-up in the Fizi region on Lake Tanganyika apparently continues.

A report from the US Embassy in Leopoldville estimates that several thousand "comparatively well-trained" rebels are in the area, equipped with Communist-manufactured munitions which have been smuggled across the lake from Tanzania.

Arms deliveries from Dar es Salaam to the Tanzanian lake town of Kigoma are evidently continuing. Congolese rebels in Kigoma apparently are well protected by Tanzanian authorities, who permit them to search for Leopoldville supporters aboard lake steamers which dock there.

The rebels may be preparing for an assault on Albertville or Uvira. Government forces in the Uvira area have withstood many attacks and are soon to be backed by about 50 mercenaries. Above Albertville, however, the morale of government troops is low, and only a few mercenaries accompany them. Two 150-ton craft were reported being fitted out in Albertville last week in an effort to stem the arms shipments, but there is no information as to whether these vessels have begun patrolling on a regular basis.

Efforts to carry out air strikes against rebels in Fizi are being hampered by ammunition shortages, caused in part by Belgium's reluctance to forward new supplies. The problem seems to rest primarily with the Belgian Defense Ministry which has reservations about becoming deeply involved militarily in the Congo and is unwilling to provide funds to allow procurement of adequate supplies of ammunition.

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NOTES

Israel-Syria: [Israel for the first time has fired on Syria's Jordan River diversion works. On 17 March Israeli artillery fire killed a Syrian bulldozer driver and destroyed some equipment being used on the project. The incident developed when the Syrians fired on an Israeli patrol moving along a disputed road. Local UN observers suspect Israel of having provoked the Syrians in order to have a pretext for the shelling.]

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Afghanistan: [Afghanistan is in deep financial trouble as its budgetary deficit for the fiscal year ending on 21 March seems certain to reach double the maximum figure which the International Monetary Fund considers tolerable. Rather than cut back on basic development projects or take other politically painful retrenchment measures, Prime Minister Yusuf seems inclined to lean more heavily on Soviet economic support. During his projected visit to Moscow in May, Yusuf may make agreements which would tie the Afghan economy more tightly to the Soviet Union unless the King intervenes.]

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South Korea: Government and opposition elements are lining up their forces for a confrontation over Seoul's plans for normalizing relations with Japan. Former president Yun Po-son is launching a nationwide drive designed to topple the government through massive popular demonstrations when the impending settlement comes up for ratification, possibly this summer. (President Pak Chong-hui is financing a new student apparatus charged with heading off demonstrations scheduled for 27 and 29 March, and has ordered the jailing of student activists if necessary. Pak is also prepared to impose martial law in the months ahead.)

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## THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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